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Abstract
This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo
moralis preferences (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016), i.e. their utility is represented by
a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a
moral hazard in teams setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically,
I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the degrees of
morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for
the principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the
production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts, the probability of a high
realization of output conditional on both agents exerting effort is sufficiently high and
either the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of morality is sufficiently
low.
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1 Introduction
Teamwork permeates economic activities. In some cases, different skills are needed comple-
menting each other to complete a project; in other cases, division of labor plays a crucial
role in timely delivery of a product. Partnerships, group projects and team sports are but
a few examples in which individuals team up to achieve a certain goal. With the exception
of partnerships, it falls upon an employer to hire the team of employees to fulfill the task at
hand. In particular, as expenditure in recruitment and assessment surges1, with US compa-
nies spending on average around US$4000 per hire, an increase of nearly 15% in the last four
years, it is clear that recruitment and talent research divisions have turned their attention
to more than the job applicants’ professional abilities. As a matter of fact, common practice
includes the analysis of criminal2 and credit histories3, and more recently, social networks as
well4.
While employees’ technical skills are important, interest in their personal characteristics
other than job-relevant skills may be related to the now widespread knowledge that eco-
nomic agents are not purely selfish, often displaying other-regarding preferences (Fehr and
Schmidt, 2006; Kolm and Ythier, 2006a,b; Kahneman et al., 1986, 1991). The literature
in behavioral and experimental economics strongly suggests that social preferences affects
outcomes in standard economic models (Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes,
2012). Bandiera et al. (2005), Bandiera et al. (2010), Barr and Serneels (2009) and Rotem-
1See O’Leonard et al. (2015).
2See the Society for Human Resource Management survey results at https://www.shrm.org/hr-
today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Pages/criminalbackgroundcheck.aspx
3See the Society for Human Resource Management survey results at https://www.shrm.org/hr-
today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Pages/creditbackgroundchecks.aspx
4See, for instance, Brown and Vaughn (2011).
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berg (2006) analyze, in particular, the role other-regarding preferences play in interactions
among employees in models of the workplace. The main findings in this literature show
that the employees’ concerns towards one another affect not only the provision of effort, but
also the compensation schemes that are offered. Thus, it is only natural to wonder what an
ideal team would look like, for a given set of skills: would it be a team composed of selfish
individuals, whose only concern is their own gains? Or maybe a group of altruistic agents,
who would be content in increasing their workmates’ wellbeing? Perhaps a crew of moral
employees deriving satisfaction in choosing actions they think are the right ones? This is the
question I address in this paper.
In view of the overwhelming experimental evidence of behaviors that are incompatible
with purely selfish preferences (Kolm and Ythier, 2006a,b; Thaler, 1988; Tversky and Thaler,
1990), it is important to understand how prosocial preferences affect behavior in the work-
place, and by extension, the design of contracts in the workplace. I propose a model to
address this question.
Specifically, I focus on the optimal compensation schemes that should be used in a stan-
dard moral hazard setting to incentivise the employees to fulfill their tasks. In doing so, I
am able to compare the profits obtained by the employer from a team composed of individ-
uals with different kinds of prosocial preferences. Although I do not study the recruitment
process per se, I am able to make predictions about which preferences the principal would
prefer.
The framework utilized is the multiagent moral hazard model, as first proposed by Alchian
and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstro¨m (1982), where a risk-neutral principal hires a team of
two risk-averse agents. The agents can exert costly effort in order to stochastically affect the
realization of output. By assumption, efforts are simultaneously and independently chosen
by the agents, and cannot be observed by the principal. On the other hand, output is
observable by third parties after being realized, and can thus be contracted upon.
In the behavioral economics literature several classes of prosocial preferences have been
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proposed. I analyze two of them. The first one is altruism5 (Becker, 1974), a class which
has been extensively used in the literature on the voluntary contribution of public goods.
This is natural since one can think of efforts made in the context of teamwork in a firm as
contributions to a public good (the firm’s profit). Second, in light of recent results by Alger
and Weibull (2013, 2016), who show that a particular, novel, class of preferences stands out as
being favored by evolution, I compare the optimal contract under altruism with the optimal
contract under this class of homo moralis preferences, a convex combination of selfishness
and morality. In sum, my model allows to address the following questions: if an employer
could choose between a team of two moral agents and a team of two altruists, which team
would he prefer, and why6?
I characterize the optimal contract for a team of equally altruistic agents and a team of
equally moral agents, and compare them. First, I find that the trade-off between risk-sharing
and incentive provision is present, as in the case with standard selfish preferences. However,
as intuition would suggest, I find that high-powered incentives are less needed to induce
effort as the agents become more concerned about the right thing to do or about each other’s
material payoff, and that the principal’s expected profit obtained from the interaction with
each team is increasing in the team’s degree of morality or altruism. Second, if efforts are
symmetric and could be contracted upon, the principal would be better off hiring a team
of altruistic agents over the other ones, for any degrees of morality and altruism, because
altruism towards one’s partner reduces the payment necessary to induce participation, one
effect that is not present with selfish or moral preferences. On the other hand, when efforts
are not observable, which team is going to be preferred depends on the production technology:
in particular, if the stochastic production technology displays increasing returns to efforts,
the altruistic team is the cheapest to hire. This is a consequence of the different nature
5For a broader debate on the definition of altruism on an evolutionary biology view, see Wilson and
Kniffin (2003).
6Alger and Weibull (2013) shows that homo moralis and altruistic preferences are behaviorally alike in
many situations, and a similar point can be found in Bergstro¨m (1995). However, this is not the case in this
exposition, as will be seen later on.
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of each class of preferences. While altruistic agents derive benefits from increased material
payoffs of their fellows, moral agents take satisfaction in doing the right thing. Intuitively,
a higher effort under increasing returns drastically increases the expected material payoff
of the agents, from which altruism is based upon. Meanwhile, the choice of the right thing
to do depends only on the contract offered by the principal, and not on the production’s
underlying technology. Therefore, under increasing returns, altruistic agents possess higher
intrinsic motivation to exert the high level of effort, thus demanding a less high-powered
contract and saving costs for the principal.
This paper is closely related to the moral hazard literature, in particular to two of its
strands: moral hazard in teams and moral hazard with pro-social preferences. Holmstro¨m
(1982) and Mookherjee (1984) characterize the basic results on moral hazard in teams that
are used to build the model below7. Itoh (2004), Englmaier and Wambach (2010), Rey-Biel
(2008) and Livio (2015) study optimal incentive schemes under different prosocial prefer-
ences: the first three focus on inequity aversion, while the last models agents exhibiting
reciprocity concerns towards each other. Barron and Gjerde (1997), Dur and Sol (2010) and
Kandel and Lazear (1992) consider moral hazard in teams problems where the agents can
monitor one another, and therefore study the effects of peer pressure on the optimal contract
design. Also, Delfgaauw and Dur (2007), Kosfeld and von Siemens (2009) and Kosfeld and
von Siemens (2011) study problems where the agents’ prosocial preferences are private in-
formation, and give conditions for separating equilibria and self-selection by different types.
None of them, however, raises the question of which preferences yields the least cost to the
principal.
The analysis below differs from the previous literature in three crucial points: first, it
considers homo moralis preferences, which hasn’t, to the best of my knowledge, been done
before in a contracting setting, thus presenting a simple environment where the principal
can profitably explore idiosyncracies generated by those and altruistic preferences. Second,
it doesn’t allow for monitoring nor private information about the agents’ preferences, so that
7Che and Yoo (2001) study optimal incentives for teams in a repeated setting.
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I can focus solely on the effect of the prosocial preferences on the optimal contract design.
Last, and more importantly, the analysis contrasts the optimal contracts under each class
of preferences, and derives conditions under which the principal would prefer hiring one
team over the other, therefore providing a rationale for firms to collect soft information on
potential employees to compose teams that will minimize the total payments to be made.
I proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the environment, while Section 3 and 4 study the
optimal contract assuming efforts are contractible and non-contractible, respectively. Section
5 concludes. For ease of exposition, all proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
2 The Model
I analyze the interaction between a principal and two agents, denoted by i ∈ {A,B}. The
principal hires the two agents to work on a joint task, which generates revenue x ∈ {xH , xL}
to the principal, where xH > xL. Each agent can exert either a low or a high effort level
ei ∈ {0, 1}. Efforts determine revenues stochastically, according to the following probability
distribution

eB = 1 eB = 0
eA = 1 p2 p1
eA = 0 p1 p0

Throughout, I assume that revenue is never certain and that the probability of achieving a
high outcome is increasing in the total effort exerted by the agents: 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0.
If effort is costless, the assumption above indicates a preference of the principal for both
agents to exert effort. However, effort is costly to each agent; for each i = A,B8,
c(ei) =
 c > 0 if ei = 1,0 if ei = 0.
The principal offers the agents contracts wi(x), i = A,B, specifying payments that will
8In reality agents may differ in their respective cost of effort, but this is not pursued in this paper because
it doesn’t qualitatively change the results, at the same time it adds a more cumbersome notation.
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follow each realization of revenues. The principal is assumed to be risk neutral, and his
payoff is given by
V (x,wA(x), wB(x)) = x− wA(x)− wB(x).
Denote by pi(ei, ej, wi(x)) the expected material payoff accruing to agent i from the
effort choices (ei, ej) and wage schedule wi(x), for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. I restrict attention
to wage schedules pairs wi = (w
H
i , w
L
i ) determining the payments following good and bad
realizations of revenues. In what follows, the material payoff function takes the expected
additively separable form
pi(ei, ej,wi) = pei+ej
[
u(wHi )− c(ei)
]
+ (1− pei+ej)
[
u(wLi )− c(ei)
]
, (1)
where u : R+ → R is the function that associates the agent’s consumption utility to each
amount of money. The dependence of i’s expected material payoff on ej comes from the
effect of the other agent’s effort on the probability distribution of revenues. The agents are
risk averse towards wages: u(w) is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave9.
The principal faces either a team consisting of two agents characterized by homo moralis
preferences with degree of morality κi ∈ [0, 1], represented by the utility function
UHM(ei, ej,wi, κi) = (1− κi)pi(ei, ej,wi) + κipi(ei, ei,wi), (2)
a team comprised of two altruistic agents, whose preferences are summarized by the utility
function
UAlt(ei, ej,wi,wj, αi) = pi(ei, ej,wi) + αipi(ej, ei,wj), (3)
for αi ∈ [0, 1] and i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. Both specifications take the standard selfish
preferences as a special case (κi = αi = 0), and this will allow comparisons between the
results to be presented below and the benchmark moral hazard problem.
9The assumption that u(·) is strictly concave can be relaxed, and the same model below can be solved
in a setting with risk-neutral agents and limited liability constraints, where the qualitative results are not
changed from the analysis below.
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As pointed in Alger and Weibull (2013) and Bergstro¨m (1995), this specification of pref-
erences for altruistic agents gives rise to the behavioral equivalence between homo moralis
preferences and altruism for αi = κi in many classes of games. With that in mind, I will
make the following assumption for the rest of the exposition.
Assumption 1: αA = αB = κA = κB = θ.
Thus, the agents’ utility function are simplified to
UHM(ei, ej,wi, θ) = (1− θ)pi(ei, ej,wi) + θpi(ei, ei,wi), (4)
UAlt(ei, ej,wi,wj, θ) = pi(ei, ej,wi) + θpi(ej, ei,wj). (5)
The relationship among the three parties unfolds as follows. First, the principal offers
each agent a contract wi, which can be either accepted or rejected by the agents. If at least
one agent rejects the contract, the game ends and every party receives his own reservation
utility. If both agents accept the principal’s offers, they play a normal form game10: both
of them must simultaneously and independently choose an effort level, from which revenues
will be realized according to the probability distribution given by the production technology
above. Payments are made according to the schedules proposed by the firm and the agents’
payoffs in the normal form game are given by their expected utilities with regard to received
wages, efforts and preferences. While each agent’s effort choice is private information, rev-
enues and wages are publicly observable. It is also assumed that the agents’ preferences are
common knowledge11.
10The normal form game here is comprised of the set of players {A,B}, the common set of pure strategies
S = {0, 1}, and payoff function U(ei, ej ,wi,wj , θ).
11This is the reason why contracts are indexed by i.
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3 Studying the Benchmark: The Contractible Effort
Case
As a starting point, I derive the optimal contract assuming efforts are observable and con-
tractible by the principal, to serve as a benchmark for later results. In what follows, I assume
that each agent possesses an outside option that gives him utility u ≥ 0 if he does not accept
the principal’s contract offer. Therefore, agent i ∈ {A,B} is willing to participate in the
proposed relationship iff
U(ei, ej,wi,wj, θ) ≥ u. (IR)
As discussed in the previous section, standard selfish preferences are a particular case of
both homo moralis and altruistic preferences, and for ease of exposition, I begin this and the
next section by analyzing the optimal contract for that instance. Thus, under contractible
efforts, the standard Borch rule
p(ei, ej)
u′(wHi )p(ei, ej)
=
1− p(ei, ej)
u′(wLi )[1− p(ei, ej)]
gives
u′(wHi )
u′(wLi )
= 1, (BRS)
which implies wHi = w
L
i = wi = u
−1 (u+ c(ei)) for ei ∈ {0, 1}. The intuition here is the
same as in the classical moral hazard problem with one principal and one agent: if effort is
contractible, the principal optimally offers a constant wage schedule remunerating the agent
according to his reservation utility and the cost of the principal’s desired level of effort.
When the principal faces a team of altruistic agents, he solves
maxwA,wB p(eA, eB)
(
xH − wHA − wHB
)
+ (1− p(eA, eB))
(
xL − wLA − wLB
)
s.t.
[
p(eA, eB)u(w
H
A ) + (1− p(eA, eB))u(wLA)− c(eA)
]
+θ
[
p(eA, eB)u(w
H
B ) + (1− p(eA, eB))u(wLB)− c(eB)
] ≥ u (IRA)[
p(eA, eB)u(w
H
B ) + (1− p(eA, eB))u(wLB)− c(eB)
]
+θ
[
p(eA, eB)u(w
H
A ) + (1− p(eA, eB))u(wLA)− c(eA)
] ≥ u (IRB)
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An interior solution is characterized by the KKT first-order conditions
− p(ei, ej) + λip(ei, ej)u′(wHi ) + λjθp(ei, ej)u′(wHi ) = 0
− [1− p(ei, ej)] + λi[1− p(ei, ej)]u′(wLi ) + λjθ[1− p(ei, ej)]u′(wLi ) = 0,
so the Borch rule becomes12
u′(wHi )
u′(wLi )
= 1, (BRAlt)
for any choices of effort (eA, eB) ∈ {0, 1}2 and i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. Therefore, if agents are
altruistic, the optimal contract under verifiable efforts proposes a constant wage schedule,
just as was the case in the benchmark selfish preferences, given by
wAlt = u−1
(
1
1 + θ
u+ c(ei)
)
, (6)
which is well-defined for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to see that for θ = 0 this is exactly
the same expression as for the optimal contract under verifiable efforts in the benchmark
case, while that for any positive degree of altruism, it is lower than it would be for selfish
agents. Intuitively, each altruistic agent recognizes that by participating in the relationship,
his partner’s material payoff increases, and therefore the wage demanded for participation
declines when the degree of altruism becomes larger.
Finally, consider the team with homo moralis preferences, in which agent i ∈ {A,B} is
willing to participate in the proposed relationship iff
UHM(ei, ej,wi, θ) = (1− θ)pi(ei, ej,wi) + θpi(ei, ei,wi) ≥ u,
i.e. iff
u(wHi )[(1− θ)p(ei, ej) + θp(ei, ei)] + u(wLi )[(1− θ)(1− p(ei, ej)) + θ(1− p(ei, ei))]− c(ei) ≥ u.
Some points are noteworthy. First, as mentioned before, in the case where θ = 0 this
participation constraint reduces to the usual (IR) constraint in the benchmark moral hazard
12Since 1 ≥ p2 > p1 > p0 ≥ 0 and u′ > 0 by assumption, the first-order conditions imply that λi +λjθ > 0
for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j.
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problem, since the selfish preference is a particular case of this framework. Second, for θ = 1,
Uκ(ei, ej,wi, 1) = pi(ei, ei,wi). In this case, agent i’s choice of effort does not depend on
agent j’s effort choice, and choosing ei becomes an individual decision problem. Third, if
ei = ej = e ∈ {0, 1}, the participation constraint collapses into
p(e, e)u(wHi ) + (1− p(e, e))u(wLi )− c(e) ≥ u,
Note here that the agents’ degrees of morality are irrelevant and the participation constraints
are exactly the same as those that would be obtained in a symmetric equilibrium in the
benchmark moral hazard problem: by imposing ei = ej, both expected material payoffs
terms are identical, and since the utility function is constructed as a convex combination of
these functions the expressions above are obtained.
By Assumption 1, every agent in each team is identical to his partner, since the only
source of heterogeneity in the general formulation was given by the preferences. Therefore,
I will restrict attention to symmetric choices of effort eA = eB in the rest of the discussion
13.
Proposition 1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, there exists c∗ > 0 such that for all
c ∈ (0, c∗) the principal induces agents in the teams of moral or altruistic agents to exert
high effort by means of a constant wage.
This result is not surprising: if efforts are contractible, the principal compensates the
agents with a fixed transfer in case they exert the desired level of effort, or punish them
if there is a deviation. Also, if the cost of exerting effort is small, then the amount the
principal has to transfer back to the agents in order to have an increased chance of obtaining
a high realization of revenues is also small, and thus profitable to implement. Moreover,
since I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, the degree of morality plays no role when
I consider a team of homo moralis agents: the compensation schedule and effort choices are
exactly the same as those obtained in the benchmark problem.
13In Appendix A2 I show that relaxing both these assumptions leads to a Borch rule for moral agents that
demands nonconstant wages when efforts are observable, in stark contracts to the literature with selfish and
altruistic agents.
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Now I can focus on the central question of the paper: given the optimal contracts that
induce the desired level of effort, which team should the principal hire?
Proposition 2: Suppose assumption 1 holds, efforts are verifiable and the principal wants
both agents to make the high effort. For any θ ∈ [0, 1], the principal prefers hiring the team
of altruistic agents team of selfish and moral agents..
Intuitively, in situations where someone fails to do the right thing, a moral agent derives
part of his utility from contemplating what would happen if everyone did the right thing. If
both agents do in fact exert high effort, the contemplation in question does not add utility
beyond the material utility that the agents thus obtain. By contrast, for altruistic agents,
any choice but high effort decreases the material payoff of both agents, and consequently all
the utility of each altruistic employee. Therefore, intrinsic motivation is larger for altruistic
agents and a team comprised of such employees is less costly for the principal.
4 Moving to the Second Best: Non-contractible Efforts
Throughout the rest of the exposition, I focus on contracts that induce both agents to
participate in the relationship and also exert the high level of effort (e = 1).
As a benchmark, focus first on standard selfish preferences. If efforts are non-contractible
and the principal wishes to induce both agents to exert effort, he must solve, for i, j ∈ {A,B},
i 6= j,
maxwA,wB p2(x
H − wHA − wHB ) + (1− p2)(xL − wLA − wLB)
s.t. p2
[
u(wHi )− c
]
+ (1− p2)
[
u(wLi )− c
] ≥ p1u(wHi ) + (1− p1)u(wLi ) (ICi)
p2
[
u(wHi )− c
]
+ (1− p2)
[
u(wLi )− c
] ≥ u. (IRi)
Manipulating the incentive compatibility constraint yields
u(wHi )− u(wLi ) ≥ cp2−p1 . (ICi)
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By assumption, c > 0 and p2 > p1. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint implies a
monotonicity constraint on the wages following a good and a bad realization of output, since
u(.) is assumed to be strictly increasing. Standard arguments show that both the incentive
compatibility and the individual rationality constraints must bind at the optimum, so that
the solution to the principal’s problem is a contract wS = (w
H
S , w
L
S ) such that
u(wLS ) = u−
p1c
p2 − p1 ,
u(wHS ) = u+
(1− p1)c
p2 − p1 .
Given the incentive compatibility constraint, it is clear that ∆wS ≡ wHS − wLS > 0.
Of course, if the principal wishes to induce the agents not to exert effort, a constant wage
schedule wH = wL = w = u−1 (u) would be optimal. Comparison of the principal’s profits
when agents exert effort and shirk show that the former is preferred by the employer for any
c ≤ cS, 0 < cS < c∗.
Under altruistic preferences for the agents, the principal’s problem is
maxwH ,wL p2(x
H − 2wH) + (1− p2)(xL − 2wL)
s.t. (1 + θ)[p2u(w
H) + (1− p2)u(wL)− c] ≥ u (IR)
(1 + θ)
[
p2u(w
H) + (1− p2)u(wL)− c
] ≥[
p1u(w
H) + (1− p1)u(wL)
]
+ θ
[
p1u(w
H) + (1− p1)u(wL)− c
]
. (IC)
Rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint as
u(wH)− u(wL) ≥ c
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1) , (7)
and notice that the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in the degree of altruism α. The
intuition behind this is the tradeoff between explicit and intrinsic incentives. Indeed, as the
agent cares less about his own material payoff relative to that of his teammate, the intrinsic
incentive derived from an increase in the probability of a high realization of output (and a
consequent raise in the expected material benefit of his partner) becomes larger than the
explicit incentives given by a high powered contract in inducing the agent to exert the high
level of effort.
13
The proposition below characterizes the optimal contract14.
Proposition 3: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. There exists cAlt > cS such that, for all
c < cAlt, it is optimal for the principal to induce both altruistic agents to exert effort, eA =
eB = 1, by means of a contract wAlt
∗ = (wHAlt, w
L
Alt) such that
∆wAlt ≡ wHAlt − wLAlt ≤ ∆wS
∀θ ∈ [0, 1], with strict inequality for any θ > 0.
Close inspection of the incentive compatibility constraint shows that any contract that
would induce a selfish agent to exert the high effort would also induce an altruistic employee
to do the same. Also, for any given contract an increase in θ would increase the utility of
each agent. Hence, the principal can profit by reducing both wages15. This argument is
formally stated below.
Corollary 1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, the principal’s expected profits are strictly
increasing in θ.
Last, I consider homo moralis preferences. The principal must choose wage vectors
wA,wB to solve
maxwA,wB p2
(
xH − wHA − wHB
)
+ (1− p2)
(
xL − wLA − wLB
)
s.t. (1− θ) [p2(u(wHi )− c) + (1− p2)(u(wLi )− c)]
+θ
[
p2(u(w
H
i )− c) + (1− p2)(u(wLi )− c)
] ≥
(1− θ) [p1u(wHi ) + (1− p1)u(wLi )]
+θ
[
p0u(w
H
i ) + (1− p0)u(wLi )
]
(ICi)
(1− θ) [p2(u(wHi )− c) + (1− p2)(u(wLi )− c)]
+θ
[
p2(u(w
H
i )− c) + (1− p2)(u(wLi )− c)
] ≥ u (IRi)
14In Appendix A I show that the optimal contracts for both moral and altruistic agents may lead to
multiplicity of equilibria in their effort choices, as in Holmstro¨m (1982).
15See Appendix B for the proof.
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for i = A,B. Note that the individual rationality constraint can be rewritten in the simpler
form
p2u(w
H
i ) + (1− p2)u(wLi )− c ≥ u,
since, in equilibrium, the principal’s offer induces the symmetric effort choice eA = eB = 1.
The incentive compatibility constraint also simplifies to
p2u(w
H
i ) + (1− p2)u(wLi )− c ≥
(1− θ) [p1u(wHi ) + (1− p1)u(wLi )]+ θ [p0u(wHi ) + (1− p0)u(wLi )] .
The right-hand side of this inequality highlights an interesting fact: a positive degree of
morality implies the agent internalizes the cost of choosing a low effort by evaluating what
would happen if the other agent also were to make the same decision. This is very different
in nature to how an altruistic agent evaluates any deviation: while the latter considers only
the effects of his own deviation on his own material payoff and on his partner’s, the former
would consider the effect of the same deviation being made by his partner on his own payoff.
Besides, by force of the assumptions presented above, further manipulation of (ICi) yields
u(wHi )− u(wLi ) ≥
c
(p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0) , (8)
where c
(p2−p1)+θ(p1−p0) > 0. Because of the strict concavity of u(·), the incentive compatibility
constraint for moral agents also implies a monotonicity condition on the optimum compen-
sation schedules offered by the principal, even when the agents display the highest degree of
morality. This last remark implies that the intrinsic incentives of the most moral agent are
not sufficiently large to overcome the need to provide him with explicit incentives to exert
the high level of effort.
Proposition 4: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. There exists cHM > cS such that, for all c <
cHM , it is optimal for the principal to induce both moral agents to exert effort, eA = eB = 1,
by means of a contract wHM
∗ = (wHHM , w
L
HM) such that
∆wHM ≡ wHHM − wLHM ≤ ∆wS
15
∀θ ∈ [0, 1], and strict inequality for θ > 0.
The intuition behind the monotonicity constraint is the same as in the benchmark model:
if wages following a low realization of revenues were larger than their counterpart after a
good realization, then agents would prefer to exert low effort in order to receive this higher
compensation and save in the cost of exerting effort.
The novelty in the results relates to how the compensation schedules varies with respect
to the degree of morality θ. Keeping in mind that u′ > 0, one can see that as θ increases
the right hand side of (ICi) becomes ever smaller, albeit positive. This implies that the gap
in wages following good and bad realizations of revenues must decrease, since the incentive
compatibility constraint binds, but monotonicity still holds. Intuitively, the principal can
reduce the compensation over high realizations of revenues given to an agent who is very
concerned about doing the right thing. But at the same time, he must increase wages after
bad outcomes in order to satisfy the participation constraint.
Because of this diminishing wage gap, intuition would suggest the first-best result is
obtained for a sufficiently high degree of morality. However, this is not the case. To see this,
take θ = 1, where agent i’s preferences are purely Kantian and, thus, his utility is completely
characterized by the expected material payoff pi(ei, ei). Although the participation constraint
doesn’t vary with the agent’s degree of morality16, the same is not true for the incentive
compatibility constraint. Now, when considering the pros and cons of a deviation in terms
of effort choice, agent i internalizes what would happen if agent j were to do the same.
Specifically, this entails a reduction in the probability of the good revenue being realized
from p2 to p0, instead of the reduction to p1 in the selfish term. This internalization is
reflected in the (ICi) constraint, which becomes
u(wHi )− u(wLi ) =
c
p2 − p0 > 0.
The denominator on the right-hand side is exactly the difference in the probabilities discussed
above. Taking θ = 1 makes the incentive compatibility constraint for a team of moral agents
16For symmetric equilibrium choices of effort.
16
as easy to satisfy as possible, but it still binds, thus pushing the optimal contract away from
the first-best one (constant wage schedule).
Given this behavior of wage schedules with respect to the degree of morality, a natural
question to be asked is whether the principal is better off with highly moral agents or not.
The answer is unconditional, and presented in the following result.
Corollary 2: The principal’s expected profit is strictly increasing in θ.
Corollary 2 contrasts with the contractible effort case, where the principal’s profits were
identical when hiring a team of selfish agents or a team of moral agents, for any degree of
morality the last would display. Mathematically, the result is a consequence of the individual
rationality constraints being identical in both cases, while the incentive compatibility con-
straint has a smaller right-hand side under moral agents than under selfish ones. Intuitively,
the principal exploits the agents’ morality, as he did with altruistic employees as well, to in-
duce high effort by means of less high-powered incentives, while inducing participation with
a slightly increased payment after a bad realization of output. Thus, one concludes that the
expected savings in wages after a good realization made by the principal by choosing a high
morality agent offsets the expected increase in payments after low revenues.
One remark is in order here. Because of the assumption that 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0
and the monotonicity condition implied by the incentive compatibility constraints for each
preferences, it is the case that U(0, 1,w; θ) ≥ U(0, 0,w; θ), where w is the optimal contract
offered by the principal. Thus, using the (IC) constraints again, I have that U(1, 1,w; θ) ≥
U(0, 0,w; θ), so the agents have no incentives to jointly deviate to shirking. The same is also
true for altruistic agents.
So far, I have showed that the principal can attain higher profits by exploiting the agents’
morality or altruism, thus reducing high-powered explicit incentives in the optimal contract
in such a way that participation and incentives to exert high effort are still satisfied. There-
fore, from the employer’s perspective, knowing which class of preferences demands the least
amount of explicit incentives is crucial. Lemma 1 tells us that the answer to that question
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depends on the stochastic production technology.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1,
[
u(wHHM)− u(wLHM)
]− [u(wHAlt)− u(wLAlt)] has the same
sign as (p2 − p1)− (p1 − p0).
In other words, if the stochastic technology presents increasing returns on aggregate
efforts, the optimal contract under homo moralis preferences is (weakly) more high-powered
than its counterpart under altruism when κ = α: any contract inducing moral agents to exert
high effort would do the same to altruistic employees. The converse is true if the technology
has decreasing returns on efforts. This can be seen in Figure 1. The middle (green) line
represents the incentive compatibility constraint for altruistic agents, whose format is not
affected by the production technology. The top (red) and the bottom (blue) lines are the
graphic representations of the (IC) constraint for moral agents when p2 − p1 > p1 − p0 and
p2 − p1 < p1 − p0, respectively17.
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Figure 1: Comparing the power of optimal contracts
HM: p2 − p1 > p1 − p0
HM: p2 − p1 < p1 − p0
Altruism
Given the result above, one would expect that the principal’s expected payoff will be uni-
formly higher if the agents are altruistic rather than moral when the production technology
17If p2 − p1 = p1 − p0, both lines coincide with the (IC) for altruistic agents.
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presents increasing returns to efforts, while the opposite would be true if decreasing returns
are present. The flaw with such a logic is not considering the effects of the binding individual
rationality constraints, which implied under contractible efforts that the team of altruistic
agents was always the cheapest to hire. In particular, remember that for altruistic agents
the outside option u is divided by 1 + θ in the participation constraint, a factor that is not
present under selfish and moral preferences. This implies that wLAlt should also be smaller
than wLHM
18. However, the principal has clear preferences over the composition of the team,
and the result below precisely states when one team is preferred over the other.
Theorem 1: Assume the principal offers contracts wHM and wAlt to homo moralis and
altruistic agents, respectively, inducing them to exert the high level of effort. Also, assume
Assumption 1 holds. Then, if the stochastic production technology exhibits
1. increasing returns to efforts (p2−p1 ≥ p1−p0), the principal is better off hiring a team
of altruistic agents over a team of moral agents;
2. decreasing returns to efforts (p2 − p1 < p1 − p0) and
• the outside option is zero (u = 0), the principal prefers a team of moral agents;
or
• the outside option is positive and the degree of morality is sufficiently low (u > 0,
κ→ 0), the principal prefers a team of moral agents only if p2 > p2 ∈ (0, 1).
Under increasing returns to efforts, an altruistic team is cheaper for the principal because
of two reasons. First, the wage that must be paid after a bad realization of output is smaller
than its counterparts under selfish or moral preferences, and this is a consequence of the
fact that the former’s consideration with regards to the payoff of his partner slackens the
participation constraint. On the other hand, such concern also slackens the incentive com-
patibility constraint in this case, because exerting efforts drastically increases the probability
18This intuition in indeed right, and integrates the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
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of being successful, thus providing implicit incentives for the altruistic worker to exert effort
and requiring a less high-powered contract to be proposed by the employer.
Such a difference in the intrinsic incentives to exert effort disappear when the production
technology has constant returns, so that the power of the contract remains the same for both
teams. However, it is still the case that the principal exploits the fact that altruistic agents
derive utility from each other’s material payoff, and can thus pay them less.
The third case, with decreasing returns to efforts, is the most interesting, because the
preference of the principal results from the net effect of two opposing forces. While it is still
true that wLAlt ≤ wLHM , Lemma 1 states that now the power of the contract required by moral
agents is smaller than the one for altruistic agents. In the range where such a reduction is the
most drastic, the principal will prefer the team of moral agents rather than altruistic ones.
The first condition for this to happen is that the probability of a success when both agents are
exerting effort is sufficiently high, as can be seen from the incentive compatibility constraints.
The second condition is that either the outside option for the agents be zero, or that if it is
positive, the degree of morality or altruism be close to zero. If both cases, the participation
constraints for moral and altruistic agents become arbitrarily close (identical if u = 0) so that
the exploitability of altruistic preferences, described in the preceding paragraph, becomes
small, and the principal profits by hiring the agents demanding the least powered contracts:
the moral agents in this case.
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c provide an example of Theorem 1 for u(w) =
√
w. Figure 2a
represents the case where the production technology exhibits increasing returns to efforts.
With the exception of θ = 0, where both teams are identical to the selfish agents, the
principal’s profit is higher with a team of altruistic agents (V Alt) than with a team of moral
agents (V HM).
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Figure 2a: Comparing principal’s profits for p2 − p1 ≥ p1 − p0
Figure 2b exemplifies the case with decreasing returns to efforts, zero outside option
for the agents and a high probability of success if both agents exert effort (namely, I set
p2 = 0.9). As Theorem 1 states, under these conditions V
HM(θ) ≥ V Alt(θ) for all equal
degrees of morality and altruism.
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Figure 2b: Comparing principal’s profits for p2 − p1 < p1 − p0
Finally, Figure 2c plots the ratio V HM/V Alt for decreasing returns to efforts and u = 0.2.
Contrary to the previous case where u = 0, the difference in the participation constraints
for moral and altruistic agents make it unprofitable to the employer hiring the moral team
if θ becomes larger, since the decrease in wLAlt would be, in expected terms, sufficient to
compensate the savings related to the power of the contract. This is represented by the
region in the figure in which V HM/V Alt ≤ 1.
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Figure 2c: Comparing the ratio of principal’s profits for p2 − p1 < p1 − p0
Therefore, a rationale in terms of the principal’s expected profits is given for trying
to sort employees with respect to their preferences. If the production technology exhibits
increasing returns with respect to efforts, the principal’s choice is straightforward: always
choose to employ altruistic agents. However, if the condition does not hold, employing
moral individuals may lead to higher profits in comparison to both altruistic and purely
selfish agents.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a comparison between the optimal contracts offered to teams of agents,
who may be characterized by either homo moralis preferences or altruism towards each
other. These contracts were explored in situations where the teams have only two agents
with binary choices of efforts, affecting stochastically the revenues accrued by the principal.
Under contractible efforts, I show that altruistic agents are more exploitable by the
principal, in the sense that the employers needs to pay a smaller wage to induce participation
of the those agents when compared to the case where he would hire a team of selfish or
moral employees. When efforts are no longer contractible, this exploitability also shows up
for moral agents, and I show that the larger the degree of altruism or morality displayed
by the members of each team, the higher the expected profits for the principal. Then, the
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natural question is which class of preferences would require smaller wages to exert effort and
participate in the contractual relationship?
The main finding is that the principal obtains a higher expected profit hiring a team
composed of moral agents under restrictive conditions: first, that the stochastic technology
exhibits decreasing returns with respect to efforts; second, that the outside option of the
agents yield zero utility or third, that the degree of morality is sufficiently low.
It is noteworthy that even in such a simple environment prosocial preferences affect the
contractual design, by adding a third channel to the traditional trade-off between risk-sharing
and incentive provision. In effect, the principal will be better off employing a team of either
altruistic or moral agents instead of a team composed solely of selfish employees, since a
higher degree of morality and altruism decreases the amount of explicit incentives provided
by the optimal contracts to induce the agents to exert effort. However, this additional
channel is not enough to completely extinguish the need for explicit incentives even when
the agents are purely moral or altruistic. Because it is more costly to the principal to hire
a team of selfish agents, the exploitability of prosocial preferences can thus explain costly
acquisition of job applicants’ soft information in the labor market.
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Appendix A1: Multiplicity of Equilibria
The optimal contracts derived in the main text are such that the principal can induce
both agents to exert the high level of effort e = 1, both for the homo moralis or altruistic
teams. However, the strategy profile (eA, eB) = (1, 1) may not be the unique Nash equi-
librium of the simultaneous game played by the pair agents for a given contract. Indeed,
let U(ei, ej,wi,wj; θ) denote agent i’s expected utility under this contract and degree of
morality or altruism θ19. Then, the stage game played by agents 1 and 2 can represented by
eB = 1 eB = 0
eA = 1 U(1, 1,wA,wB; θ) U(1, 0,wA,wB; θ)
eA = 0 U(0, 1,wA,wB; θ) U(0, 0,wA,wB; θ)
From the principal’s problem, the incentive compatibility constraint implies that
U(1, 1,wA,wB; θ) ≥ U(0, 1,wA,wB; θ),
i.e. given that the other agent is already exerting the high level of effort, it is not profitable
for agent A to shirk when his compensation follows the optimal contract w∗. Since this is
true for both agents, it follows that (eA, eB) = (1, 1) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for
w∗.
However, the comparison between U(1, 0,wA,wB; θ) and U(0, 0,wA,wB; θ) is not clear.
In particular, if the latter is greater than the former, then (eA, eB) = (0, 0) would constitute
another pure strategy Nash equilibrium for w∗.
19Given the symmetry of the problem, I focus attention on agent A and drop the subscripts. The same
results would hold for agent B by simply reversing the effort choices eA and eB .
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Under homo moralis preferences, note that
U(0, 0,w∗; θ) ≥ U(1, 0,w∗; θ)⇔
p0u(w
H) + (1− p0)u(wL) ≥ (1− θ)[p1u(wH) + (1− p1)u(wL)− c] + θ[p2u(wH) + (1− p2)u(wL)− c]⇔
c ≥ u(wH)[(1− θ)p1 + θp2 − p0] + u(wL)[(1− θ)(1− p1) + θ(1− p2)− (1− p0)]⇔
c ≥ u(wH)[(1− θ)p1 + θp2 − p0]− u(wL)[(1− θ)p1 + θp2 − p0]⇔
c ≥ [u(wH)− u(wL)][(1− θ)p1 + θp2 − p0]⇔
c ≥ c
(p2 − p1) + κ(p1 − p0) [(1− κ)p1 + κp2 − p0]⇔
(p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0) ≥ (p1 − p0) + θ(p2 − p1)⇔
(p2 − p1)− (p1 − p0) ≥ θ[(p2 − p1)− (p1 − p0)]⇔
(1− θ) [(p2 − p1)− (p1 − p0)] ≥ 0,
while for altruistic preferences
U(0, 0,wAlt
∗; θ) ≥ U(1, 0,wAlt∗; θ)⇔
(1 + θ)[p0u(w
H
Alt) + (1− p0)u(wLAlt)] ≥ (1 + θ)[p1u(wHAlt) + (1− p1)u(wLAlt)]− c⇔
c ≥ (1 + θ)(p1 − p0)[u(wHAlt)− u(wLAlt)] = (1 + θ)(p1 − p0)
c
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1) ⇔
p2 − p1 ≥ p1 − p0.
Observe that the inequality for moral agents is always satisfied if θ = 1. On the other
hand, if κ ∈ [0, 1), that inequality holds iff p2− p1 ≥ p1− p0. Therefore, the following result
holds.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 1 holds and that the principal offers the optimal contracts
wHM and wAlt for the teams of moral and altruistic agents, respectively. Then, eA = eB = 1
is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous choice of effort game played by
the agents iff p2− p1 < p1− p0, and θ < 1 for homo moralis agents. Otherwise, eA = eB = 0
is also a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
One remark about asymmetric equilibria must be made here. If p2 − p1 = p1 − p0,
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both an altruistic and a moral agent will be indifferent between shirking and exerting effort
when their partners are shirking. Moreover, since the optimal contract satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraint with equality for both types of pro-social preferences, the workers
are also indifferent between shirking or not when their partner is exerting the high effort.
Therefore, in this case, the asymmetric efforts (eA = 1, eB = 0) and (eA = 0, eB = 1) are
also pure strategy Nash equilibria of the simultaneous choice of effort game.
Appendix A2: Obtaining the Borch Rule for Asymmet-
ric Efforts Under Homo Moralis Preferences
Relax Assumption 1 and consider the contracting problem of a team of moral agents when
efforts are observable. If the principal wishes to induce asymmetric choices of effort, constant
wages are not optimal for moral agents, as they were to altruistic and selfish agents20. Note
first that the Borch rule for teams of selfish and altruistic agents are derived for an arbitrary
pair (eA, eB), and the ratio of marginal utilities with high or low wages are equal to 1 whether
eA = eB or not. For homo moralis preferences suppose, without loss of generality, that agent
A exerts high effort while agent B exerts low effort. In this case, the principal solves
maxwA,wB p1
(
xH − wHA − wHB
)
+ (1− p1)
(
xL − wLA − wLB
)
s.t. (1− κA)
[
p1u(w
H
A ) + (1− p1)u(wLA)
]
+κA
[
p2u(w
H
A ) + (1− p2)u(wLA)
]− c ≥ u (IRA)
(1− κB)
[
p1u(w
H
B ) + (1− p1)u(wLB)
]
+κB
[
p0u(w
H
B ) + (1− p0)u(wLB)
] ≥ u (IRB)
Close observation of the constraints reveals two differences between them. First, only (IRA)
contains the cost of effort, since agent A is the only one to exert high effort. Second, and
more important, the probabilities of high and low realizations of revenues in the Kantian
morality terms of the two constraints are different, but the same in the other term. This
20As shown by the Borch rules (BRS), (BRAlt)
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is true because each agent evaluates the consequence of his own effort should both agents
choose this particular effort.
The wages must satisfy the Borch rule, given by
p1
u′(wHA ) [(1− κA)p1 + κAp2]
=
1− p1
u′(wLA) [(1− κA)(1− p1) + κA(1− p2)]
,
p1
u′(wHB ) [(1− κB)p1 + κBp0]
=
1− p1
u′(wLB) [(1− κB)(1− p1) + κB(1− p0)]
.
Observe that the usual finding that wHi = w
L
i = w
FB
i is only obtained if κi = 0, that is, only
if both agents display the standard selfish preferences. If the degree of morality is not zero,
the marginal utility ratios must be such that
u′(wHA )
u′(wLA)
=
(1− κA)p1(1− p1)− κAp1p2 + κAp1
(1− κA)p1(1− p1)− κAp1p2 + κAp2 < 1,
u′(wHB )
u′(wLB)
=
(1− κB)p1(1− p1)− κBp1p0 + κBp1
(1− κB)p1(1− p1)− κBp1p0 + κBp0 > 1,
which implies the optimal contract satisfies wHA > w
L
A and w
H
B < w
L
B.
Therefore, should the principal want to induce the moral agents to undertake different
efforts, two differences arise in comparison to the selfish and altruistic preferences cases.
First, the general argument that the principal should pay a constant wage (that satisfies the
participation constraint) in case the appropriate level of effort is exerted by the agent no
longer holds. Indeed, for the agent exerting high effort, a monotonicity result similar to the
one obtained in the second-best cases of the traditional moral hazard problems is observed.
On the other hand, agent B, who is not supposed to exert effort, is paid according to a
reverse monotonicity result: wage after a good realization of revenue must be lower than its
counterpart after a bad realization. These results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5: Suppose the principal restricts attention to asymmetric equilibria of the kind
ei = 1 > ej = 0 for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j when the agents exhibit homo moralis preferences.
Then, there does not exist a constant contract (wHi = w
L
i and w
H
j = w
L
J ) that maximizes the
principal’s profits and satisfies the agents participation constraints.
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: assume ei = ej = e ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {A,B}. The discussion in
the main text shows that the optimal contract under contractible efforts for teams of selfish
or moral agents is
wFB = u−1 (u+ c(e)) ,
while altruistic agents must be compensated according to
wFBi,Alt = u
−1
(
1
1 + θ
u+ c(e)
)
.
Denoting by V FB11 and V
FB
00 the principal’s expected profits in the cases where both agents
exert high and low effort, respectively, and the teams are comprised of either selfish or moral
agents. Plugging in the optimal wages obtained above yields
V FB11 = p2x
H + (1− p2)xL − 2u−1(u+ c)
V FB00 = p0x
H + (1− p0)xL − 2u−1(u)
and thus V FB11 ≥ V FB00 if and only if
u−1(u+ c)− u−1(u) ≤ (x
H − xL)(p2 − p0)
2
.
By assumption, p2 > p0 and x
H > xL, so the right-hand side is strictly positive, while u′ > 0
implies the left-hand side is also positive since c > 0. By continuity of u, there exists c′ > 0
such that 2 (u−1(u+ c′)− u−1(u)) = (xH − xL)(p2 − p0), and the inequality above holds for
all c ∈ (0, c′].
Now, doing the same for altruistic agents, write
V FB11,Alt = p2x
H + (1− p2)xL − 2u−1
(
1
1 + θ
u+ c
)
V FB00,Alt = p0x
H + (1− p0)xL − 2u−1
(
1
1 + θ
u
)
where an argument similar to the paragraph above implies that there exists c′′ > 0 such
that, ∀c ∈ [0, c′′), V FB11,Alt > V FB00,Alt.
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Letting c∗ = min{c′, c′′} concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2: since u is a strictly increasing strictly concave function by assump-
tion, its inverse u−1 is, on its turn, a strictly increasing strictly convex function. Therefore,
since
u ≥ u 1
1 + θ
for all θ ∈ [0, 1], the amount of compensation dispensed by the principal is larger under homo
moralis or selfish preferences. 
Proof of Proposition 3: under Assumption 1 and eA = eB = 1, the optimal symmetric
contract wAlt
∗ = (wHAlt, w
L
Alt) offered by the principal must solve
maxwH ,wL p2(x
H − 2wH) + (1− p2)(xL − 2wL)
s.t. (1 + θ)[p2u(w
H) + (1− p2)u(wL)− c] ≥ u (IR)
u(wH)− u(wL) ≥ c
(1+θ)(p2−p1) (IC)
where the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality, and given by
u′(wHAlt)(1 + θ)[λp2 + µ(p2 − p1)] = p2 (2.1)
u′(wLAlt)(1 + θ)[λ(1− p2)− µ(p2 − p1)] = (1− p2) (2.2)
λ
{
(1 + θ)[p2u(w
H
Alt) + (1− p2)u(wLAlt)− c]− u
}
= 0 (2.3)
µ
{
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)[u(wHAlt)− u(wLAlt)]− c
}
= 0 (2.4)
(1 + θ)[p2u(w
H
Alt) + (1− p2)u(wLAlt)− c]− u ≥ 0 (2.5)
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)[u(wHAlt)− u(wLAlt)]− c ≥ 0 (2.6)
λ ≥ 0 (2.7)
µ ≥ 0 (2.8)
Note that λ = 0 cannot be a solution since it violates equation (2.2), because u′ > 0 and
1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0 by assumption. Moreover, µ > 0; otherwise, equations (2.1) and (2.2)
would imply
u′(wHAlt) =
1
(1 + θ)λ
= u′(wLAlt),
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which yields wLAlt = w
H
Alt for all θ ∈ [0, 1] since u′′ < 0, thus violating the incentive compati-
bility constraint in (2.2). Therefore, any solution must have λ, µ > 0 such that λp2 + µ(p2 − p1) > 0λ(1− p2)− µ(p2 − p1) > 0
Since the Lagrange multipliers are strictly positive, the optimal contract is fully charac-
terized by the binding IC and IR, which rearranged result in
u(wHAlt) =
u
1 + θ
+ c
[(1− p1) + θ(p2 − p1)]
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1) ,
u(wLAlt) =
u
1 + θ
− c [p1 − θ(p2 − p1)]
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1) .
Differentiation of the incentive compatibility constraint with respect to θ leads to
∂(wHAlt − wLAlt)
∂θ
< 0.
Given the optimal contract, one must again wonder whether the principal will induce
both agents to exert high effort or not. If not, then the principal can offer the constant
wage w = u−1
(
u
1+θ
)
as before, since this satisfies the participation constraint, but not the
incentive compatibility constraint. Thus, the principal’s expected payoff in this case is again
given by
V00(θ) = p0x
H + (1− p0)xL − 2u−1
(
u
1 + θ
)
,
while inducing high effort yields expected profits
V11(θ) = p2
[
xH − 2wHAlt
]
+ (1− p2)
[
xL − 2wLAlt
]
.
Consequently, it is only beneficial to the principal demanding high effort from both agents
if V11(θ) ≥ V00(θ), that is,
(p2 − p0)(xH − xL) + 2u−1
(
u
1 + θ
)
≥ 2
[
p2u
−1
(
u
1 + θ
+
c[(1− p1) + θ(p2 − p1)]
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)
)
+(1− p2)u−1
(
u
1 + θ
− c [p1 − θ(p2 − p1)]
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)
)]
.
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Take c = 0. The the right-hand side reduces to 2[p2u
−1 ( u
1+θ
)
+ (1 − p2)u−1
(
u
1+θ
)
] =
2u−1
(
u
1+θ
)
, and the inequality is automatically satisfied, since 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0
and xH > xL by assumption.
Therefore, by continuity, ∃cAlt > 0 such that ∀c ∈ (0, cAlt], V11(θ) ≥ V00(θ). 
Proof of Corollary 1: take θ0, θ1 ∈ [0, 1] such that θ0 < θ1, and let w∗Alt(θ) =
(
wHAlt(θ), w
L
Alt(θ)
)
denote the optimal wage offered by the principal when agents display the degree of morality
θ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for any θ ∈ [0, 1], let C(θ) denote the set of contracts satisfying both
the IR and IC constraints for the degree of altruism θ, so that w∗Alt(θ) ∈ C(θ).
Then, using the constraints, one can check that
u(wHAlt(θ0))− u(wLAlt(θ0)) =
c
(1 + θ0)(p2 − p1) >
c
(1 + θ1)(p2 − p1)
and
u = (1+θ0)[p2u(w
H
Alt(θ0))+(1−p2)u(wLAlt(θ0))−c] < (1+θ1)[p2u(wHAlt(θ0))+(1−p2)u(wLAlt(θ0))−c],
so that w∗Alt(θ0) ∈ C(θ1). However, the KKT conditions imply that w∗Alt(θ1) is the unique so-
lution to the principal’s problem for θ = θ1. Then, it must be the case that V
Alt
11 (w
∗
Alt(θ1); θ1) >
V Alt11 (w
∗
Alt(θ0); θ1).
Now, observe that
dwHAlt(θ)
dθ
= − 1
u′(wHAlt(θ0))
[
(1− p2)c
(1 + θ)2(p2 − p1) +
u
(1 + θ)2
]
< 0.
Thus, keeping wLAlt(θ1) = w
L
Alt(θ0) and taking w
H
Alt(θ1) = w
H
Alt(θ0) − ε, ε ≈ 0, the principal
satisfies both constraints while increasing his payoff by 2p2ε > 0. Therefore, the principal’s
expected profit is strictly increasing in θ. 
Proof of Proposition 4: the principal’s problem is given by
L = p2
[
xH − wHi − wHj
]
+ (1− p2)
[
xL − wLi − wLj
]
+
∑2
i=1 λi
[
p2u(w
H
i ) + (1− p2)u(wLi )− c− u
]
+
∑2
i=1 µi
[(
u(wHi )− u(wLi )
)
((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0))− c
]
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for i = A,B and j 6= i. Then, the KKT conditions are given by the system of equations
−p2 + λip2u′(wHi ) + µiu′(wHi ) ((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)) = 0 (3.1)
−(1− p2) + λi(1− p2)u′(wLi )− µiu′(wLi ) ((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)) = 0 (3.2)
p2u(w
H
i ) + (1− p2)u(wLi )− c ≥ u (3.3)(
u(wHi )− u(wLi )
)
((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0))− c ≥ 0 (3.4)
λi
[
p2u(w
H
i ) + (1− p2)u(wLi )− c− u
]
= 0 (3.5)
µi
[(
u(wHi )− u(wLi )
)
((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0))− c
]
= 0 (3.6)
λi ≥ 0 (3.7)
µi ≥ 0 (3.8)
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) clearly show that λi = µi = 0 is not a possibility. Indeed, if
that was the case, then p2 = 0, which contradicts our initial assumption. Also, I cannot have
µi > 0 = λi, because this would imply equation (3.2) is not satisfied. So, I must either have
λi > 0 = µi or λi, µi > 0. Solving for the multipliers in equations (3.1) and (3.2) yields
λi =
(1− p2)u′(wHi ) + p2u′(uLi )
u′(wHi )u′(w
L
i )
> 0
µi =
p2(1− p2)(u′(wLi )− u′(wHi ))
u′(wHi )u′(w
L
i )((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0))
> 0
so both the (ICi) and (IRi) constraints bind. Thus, using equations (3.3) and (3.4) one finds
the optimal schedule must satisfy
u(wLi ) = u−
c[(1− κi)p1 + κip0]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
u(wHi ) = u+
c[(1− p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0) .
Differentiating this expressions with respect to κi yields
dwHi
dκi
= − (1− p2)(p1 − p0)
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
c
u′(wHi )
< 0
dwLi
dκi
=
p2(p1 − p0)
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
c
u′(wLi )
> 0.
Given the optimal contract, one must again wonder whether the principal will induce
both agents to exert high effort or not. If not, then the principal can offer the constant wage
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w = u−1(u) as before, since this satisfies the participation constraint, but not the incentive
compatibility constraint. Thus, the principal’s expected payoff in this case is again given by
V00(κ) = p0x
H + (1− p0)xL − 2u−1(u),
while inducing high effort yields expected profits
V11(κ) = p2
[
xH −
∑
i=A,B
u−1
(
u+
c[(1− p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
)]
+ (1− p2)
[
xL −
∑
i=A,B
u−1
(
u− c[(1− κi)p1 + κip0]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
)]
.
Consequently, it is only beneficial to the principal demanding high effort from both agents
if V11(κ) ≥ V00(κ), that is,
(p2 − p0)(xH − xL) + 2u−1(u) ≥
∑
i=A,B
[
p2u
−1
(
u+
c[(1− p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
)
+(1− p2)u−1
(
u− c[(1− κi)p1 + κip0]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
)]
.
Take c = 0. The the right-hand side reduces to
∑
i=A,B[p2u
−1(u)+(1−p2)u−1(u)] = 2u−1(u),
and the inequality is automatically satisfied, since 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0 and x
H > xL by
assumption.
Therefore, by continuity, ∃cHM > 0 such that ∀c ∈ (0, cHM ], V11(κ) ≥ V00(κ). 
Proof of Corollary 2: denote again the principal’s indirect expected profits by V11(κA, κB).
Then,
∂V11(κA, κB)
∂κi
= −p2dw
H
i
dκi
− (1− p2)dw
L
i
dκi
=
c(p1 − p0)
[(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]2
[
p2(1− p2)
u′(wHi )
− (1− p2)p2
u′(wLi )
]
=
c(p1 − p0)(1− p2)p2
[(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
×u
′(wLi )− u′(wHi )
u′(wLi )u′(w
H
i )
> 0
since wHi > w
L
i by the monotonicity implied by the (ICi) and u
′′ < 0. Therefore, the
principal’s expected payoff is strictly increasing in each degree of morality κi.
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In a similar fashion, let U(κi) denote the agent’s indirect utility under the optimal con-
tract. Then,
∂U(κi)
∂κi
= p2u
′(wHi )
dwHi
dκi
+ (1− p2)u′(wLi )
dwLi
dκi
=
c(p1 − p0)
[(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]2
[−p2(1− p2) + (1− p2)p2] = 0.

Proof of Lemma 1: let κ = α = θ ∈ [0, 1], c > 0 and 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0 by assumption.
Then
c
(p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0) ≥
c
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1) ⇔
(p2 − p1) + θ(p2 − p1) ≥ (p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0)⇔
p2 − p1 ≥ p1 − p0.

Proof of Theorem 1: let hH = u(wH) and hL = u(wL), which are uniquely determined
for any values of w since u is strictly increasing by assumption. The principal’s problem can
thus be rewritten as
maxhL,hH p2
(
xH − 2u−1(hH))+ (1− p2) (xL − 2u−1(hL))
subject to
(hL, hH) ∈ CHM(θ) =
{
(h1, h2) ∈ R2 : p2h2 + (1− p2)h1 − c ≥ u, h2 − h1 ≥ c
k2 + θk1
}
if the principal is hiring a team of moral agents, and
(hL, hH) ∈ CAlt(θ) =
{
(h1, h2) ∈ R2 : p2h2 + (1− p2)h1 − c ≥ u
1 + θ
, h2 − h1 ≥ c
(1 + θk2
}
,
where k1 = p1− p0 > 0 and k2 = p2− p1 > 0, if he considers a team of altruistic agents. The
sets CHM(θ) and CAlt(θ) collect all the values of hL and hH satisfying the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints for a given degree of morality or altruism θ ∈ [0, 1].
34
First, notice that for any value of θ ∈ [0, 1], a pair (hL, hL) ∈ CHM(θ) also satisfies the
(IR) constraint in CAlt(θ): indeed, p2h2 + (1− p2)h1 − c ≥ u ≥ u1+θ for u ≥ 0.
Suppose that p2−p1 ≥ p1−p0, i.e k2 ≥ k1. Then, by Lemma 1, hHHM−hLHM ≥ hHAlt−hLAlt,
which implies the optimal contract under homo moralis preferences also satisfies the incentive
compatibility of altruistic agents, so that (hLHM(θ), h
H
HM(θ)) ∈ CAlt(θ). This implies that
CHM(θ) ⊂ CAlt(θ), one can conclude that V Alt11 (θ) ≥ V HM11 (θ). This can be graphically seen
in Figure A.1.
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Figure A.1: Optimal contracts for p2 − p1 > p1 − p0
Suppose now that p2−p1 < p1−p0, i.e. k2 < k1. In this case, the incentive compatibility
constraint for moral agents is below the one for altruistic agents, as can be seen in Figure
A.2 and implied by Lemma 1, but because the reverse holds for the participation constraint,
one cannot say that CAlt(θ) ⊂ CHM(θ). Using the results in Propositions 2 and 3, one can
check that
hLHM − hLAlt = u−
u
1 + θ
+ c− c+ p2c
(
1
(1 + θ)k2
− 1
k2 + θk1
)
=
θu
1 + θ
+
p2cθ(k1 − k2)
(1 + θ)k2(k2 + θk1)
≥ 0
for all θ ∈ [0, 1], u ≥ 0, c > 0 and 0 < p0 < p1 < p2 < 1. Thus, the wage paid after a
bad realization of output for a moral agent is larger than the corresponding wage paid to an
altruistic agent if k1 > k2. Therefore, the principal can only be better off hiring a team of
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moral agents if the wage paid after a good realization of output to the latter is sufficiently
smaller than the one paid for altruistic agents and the isoprofit curve is sufficiently flat. The
former holds only if
hHHM − hHAlt = hLHM − hLAlt + c
(
1
k2 + θk1
− 1
(1 + θ)k2
)
=
θu
1 + θ
− (1− p2)cθ(k1 − k2)
(1 + θ)k2(k2 + θk1)
< 0.
For θ ∈ (0, 1], c > 0 and 0 < p0 < p1 < p2 < 1, the inequality above holds iff
u(k2 + θk1) <
1− p2
p2 − p1 (k1 − k2),
that is, for u = 0 or small values of θ for u > 0.
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Figure A.2: Optimal contracts for p2 − p1 < p1 − p0
Now, remember that the slope of the isoprofit curve for the principal is given by dh
H
dhL
=
−1−p2
p2
u′(wH)
u′(wL) < 0, which becomes flatter as p2 approaches 1. Thus, if k1 > k2, the principal
is better off with a team of moral agents if p2 is close to 1 and either u = 0 or u > 0 and
θ → 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5: existence of the contract follows from the KKT conditions written
on the main text. The same goes for the inequalities on the wage schedules. 
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